

## Chapter VIII

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# The Dieppe Raid: Montgomery's Role Reassessed

Peter Henshaw

**B**ernard Montgomery has been charged with various sins in connection with the Dieppe raid. He supposedly initiated the change from a flank to a frontal assault; insisted that a Canadian division take on the task; ordered that the assault be launched in daylight instead of darkness; took the decision to proceed without heavy bombing support; and, merely in reaction to the snub of being removed from the chain of command, advised that the operation be cancelled for all time. Others involved in the raid have certainly shown little reluctance to blame Montgomery for the plan's shortcomings, especially after Montgomery, in his memoirs, criticized the planning and sought to absolve himself of responsibility for it. But, as will be shown, most of their claims are without foundation and originate in the post-raid maneuverings by individuals and organizations to shift blame away from themselves.<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup> For criticisms of Montgomery, see the transcript of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation program, "Close-Up: Dieppe", 9 Sept. 1962, Canada, Department of National Defence (DND), file 594.009(D.13); Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, 22 July 1958, Britain, Public Record Office (PRO), Admiralty papers, ADM 205/173; and Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, 27 June 1962, Britain, Imperial War Museum (IWM), Hughes-Hallett papers. Lord Montgomery's comments on the raid are in *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein* (London, 1958), 76-7. Publicly, Crerar eschewed discussion of the raid. In private he emphasized Montgomery's responsibility. See Crerar to Stacey, 11 June 1944, Canada, National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 24, vol. 10,634. On the determination within the Combined Operations Organization to launch a raid see: J. Hughes-Hallett, "The Mounting of Raids," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*, 95 (Nov. 1950), p. 585.

Almost as soon as the scale of the disaster at Dieppe became apparent, a tussle began over the history of the plan's origins and development. At stake was much more than the responsibility for Canadian and Allied casualties. The staffs of Combined Operations, British Army Home Forces, and the Canadian Army in Britain were all conscious that the charge of planning incompetence in the case of Dieppe would have the most damaging and wide-ranging repercussions in their struggles to assert their independent authority in future operations. Each of these organizations was concerned that the planning and execution of raids should not be controlled exclusively by the other two. Home Forces could not see why the military side of any amphibious operation launched from Britain should not be its responsibility, nor why the Canadian Army in Britain should operate outside of the Home Forces chain of command. The Canadian Army, for its part, sought to use the authority conferred upon it by Canada's constitutional equality with Britain and exert maximum control over the planning and execution of any operation involving Canadian troops. Combined Operations believed that to have a meaningful function, it must take charge of everything from raids to the final return to the continent. All three organizations strived to increase or at least maintain their authority over the Dieppe raid whilst the operation was in the planning stages. Once the terrible outcome became known, each then tried to down-play its own responsibility and shift attention to that of the others. Montgomery's true role has, in the process, been severely distorted.<sup>2</sup>

Nowhere is this clearer than in the recriminations over the formulation of the outline plan. The British Army, determined to



<sup>2</sup> For the struggle between the British Army, Home Forces, and the Canadian Army in Britain, see: C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War*, vol. I, *The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific* (Ottawa, 1955), pp. 194-96, 255-56, 321-23 and 338. For that between Combined Operations and Home Forces see: B.L. Villa, *Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid* (Toronto, 1989), pp. 163-84; N. Hamilton, *Montgomery*, vol. I, *The Making of a General* (London, 1981), pp. 547-9.

prevent Combined Operations from gaining a free hand to launch amphibious raids ever larger in size, insisted that the General Staff of Home Forces must approve and have a say in any operation involving forces drawn from its command. Representatives from Home Forces thus joined Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) staff in a planning syndicate soon after COHQ had put forward the idea of a division-sized raid on Dieppe. After the raid, COHQ would protest that it had lost control over the planning as soon as Home Forces became involved.<sup>3</sup>

In fact, COHQ and Home Forces planners must share responsibility for the outline plan. According to the procedure in place when *Rutter* (as the raid on Dieppe was initially code-named) was being planned, the outline plan for any raid was supposed to be prepared by the Chief of Combined Operations in collaboration with General Headquarters (GHQ) Home Forces *before* it was submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee for approval. Montgomery was not part of GHQ Home Forces. He was in charge of a subordinate command. He did not become involved in the planning until General Sir Bernard Paget, the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, delegated his responsibility for overseeing planning to the officer in charge of South Eastern Command, i.e. Montgomery. By the time that this was done, planning officers from GHQ Home Forces and Combined Operations were well on their way to producing the outline plan.<sup>4</sup>

Any attempt to judge Montgomery's role in formulating the outline plan encounters two problems: first, there is no contem-



<sup>3</sup> "Combined Report", CB04244, PRO, Cabinet papers, CAB 98/22; Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, 27 June 1962, IWM, Hughes-Hallett papers; F.H. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, vol. II, *Its Influence on Strategy and Operations* (London, 1981), p. 696; Mountbatten to Brooke, 31 Aug. 1942, CAB 127/24.

<sup>4</sup> Stacey, *Six Years of War*, I, pp. 329-30; Swayne to HQ Canadian Army, 5 May 1942, RG 24, vol. 10,750.

porary evidence of Montgomery's attendance at any planning meeting before the outline plan was agreed by Mountbatten and representatives from GHQ Home Forces; and, secondly, the formal procedures for planning combined operations of this scale were being formulated at the same time as *Rutter* was being planned - individuals and organizations were thus becoming involved in the planning before the procedures authorizing them to do so were officially promulgated. So, there is no certainty regarding even the date when Montgomery became involved with the planning. But, after the raid was over, the fragmentary nature of the related written records and the seemingly sweeping powers accorded to him as the "responsible military officer," meant that it was easy to ascribe responsibility to Montgomery.<sup>5</sup>

This was especially so when others involved in the raid tried to explain the failure of the landings on the Dieppe sea-front. Combined Operations rapidly took shelter behind the defense that its planners had preferred an attack launched exclusively from the flanks but were over-ruled by the staff of another service. There seems to be no strictly contemporary record of the decision to adopt a frontal assault. The "Combined Report" on the raid, issued by Combined Operations in October 1942, noted that "shortly after" 14 April, Montgomery "became closely associated with the military side of the planning and attended the principal meetings of the planners." The report went on to say that "Army representatives" at a later meeting advocated a plan that included a frontal assault in preference to one proposed by Combined Operations that involved only flank assaults. That Montgomery was one of these representatives was clearly implied. The main source of information on this question appears, however, to be a memorandum written in Combined Operations Headquarters after the raid was over, dated 14 September 1942. This makes no reference to Montgomery.



<sup>5</sup> Stacey, *Six Years of War*, I, p. 329; Minutes of meeting held at COHQ on 25 April 1942, copy in Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) Report 153, DND; Hamilton, *Montgomery*, I, p. 550.



Surviving minutes indicate that on 14 April Hughes-Hallett presented a brief outline of a plan at a meeting attended by G.V. McNabb, the Brigadier General Staff (Plans), Home Forces. The details of the plan were not recorded. The 14 September memorandum claimed that about 18 April there was a "verbal discussion (of which there is no written record)" in which it was generally agreed "that on balance there were advantages in taking the town by a frontal assault." Home Forces was apparently represented by Brigadier McNabb and Major-General P.G.S. Gregson-Ellis, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff. The minutes of a meeting on 21 April indicate that a "direct assault" had already been agreed by this date. The "Combined Report" argues, instead, that the decision against a Combined Operations plan for a flank assault, in favour of the Army's plan for a frontal assault, was made at a meeting on 25 April. However, as C.P. Stacey, the Canadian Army's official historian, noted, the actual minutes of this meeting contain no reference to any discussion of this question. The 1942 "Combined Report" and the 1956 confidential "History of the Combined Operations Organization" never actually name Montgomery as being in attendance when the frontal assault was agreed, though his responsibility for this decision is clearly suggested by the emphasis placed on his early involvement.<sup>6</sup>

By 1958, when Montgomery's strident criticisms of the raid were about to be published, the defenders of COHQ were prepared to be more bold. Mountbatten, by then the chief of the British naval staff, prompted Hughes-Hallett to revise a section of the naval staff history of the raid so that it would create the impression that Montgomery himself proposed the frontal assault. Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett hoped that the recollections of other COHQ veterans would confirm this version of events. Walter Skrine, the COHQ planner most closely associat-



<sup>6</sup> "Combined Report," Oct. 1942, CAB 98/22; "Notes on Principal Changes in the Military Plan," G.2 P.1 to VCCO, 14 Sept. 1942, in CMHQ 153.

ed with the military side of *Rutter*, could not agree that the idea of the frontal assault was suggested by Montgomery in the first instance: "I never heard of this, at any time, before reading Admiral Hughes-Hallett's suggested draft on the 'Origin of the Plan'." Robert Henriques, another COHQ planner, recalled his own presence "on the occasion when General Montgomery came to a small meeting at C.O.H.Q. - I think it was his first meeting there - when he informed us somewhat brusquely the he would NOT require the services of the C.O.H.Q. planners in preparing his detailed plans." Neither Henriques nor Skrine could recall Montgomery's exerting any influence on the outline plan. The Admiralty's official version of events was nevertheless revised (at Mountbatten's insistence) to include Hughes-Hallett's assertion that Montgomery proposed "a dawn frontal assault" which was adopted despite COHQ objections.<sup>7</sup>

In years to come, Hughes-Hallett continued to make assertions along these lines. On Canadian television in 1962, Hughes-Hallett repeated the claim that Montgomery "objected to the flank attacks," advocating a frontal assault instead. Later, in his memoirs, Hughes-Hallett argued that Montgomery had wasted no time in calling for a meeting in which he insisted on a frontal assault after declaring the military part of the plan to be "the work of an amateur." Renewed currency has been given to this version of events by Philip Ziegler (who accepted the Hughes-Hallett memoirs as gospel when writing Mountbatten's biography), and by Denis and Shelagh Whitaker (who, in effect, did the same, stating bluntly that Montgomery was the plan's author).<sup>8</sup>



<sup>7</sup> Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, 22 July 1958, ADM 205/173; Skrine to Haydon, 17 Aug. 1958 and Henriques to Haydon, 12 Aug. 1958, IWM, Haydon papers; "Raid on Dieppe," ADM 205/174.

<sup>8</sup> "Close-Up: Dieppe," DND, file 594.009(D13); J. Hughes Hallett, "Before I Forget" (unpublished memoirs), 1972, pp. 152-53, NAC, Hughes-Hallett papers, MG 30, E463; P. Ziegler, *Mountbatten: The Official Biography* (London, 1985), p. 188; D. and S. Whitaker, *Dieppe: Tragedy to Triumph* (Whitby, 1992), p. 167.

Another distortion of Montgomery's role in the raid is the claim that Canadian troops undertook the raid because he chose to use the 2nd Canadian Division. This view comes out clearly in a British official history written by Christopher Buckley, authorized by Combined Operations and probably scrutinized before publication by Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett. Buckley states that Montgomery's influence "made the raid on Dieppe so largely a Canadian affair." Stacey, while making plain that the Canadian Army was anxious for action, published nothing definite to alter the impression that Canadian troops became involved on the initiative of Home Forces. In the strictest sense they did, but as Brian Villa's work indicates, Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar (first as acting commander of the Canadian Army in Britain during Andrew McNaughton's absence, then as corps commander under McNaughton) was a prime mover in having a Canadian formation selected. Henriques recalled that Montgomery "came into the picture, not as 'a senior officer nominated by the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces' - although this may have been the reason formally recorded in the Chiefs of Staff minutes - but because it was decided for political reasons to employ the Canadians who were in South East Command." Montgomery's involvement appears to have been a consequence, not a cause, of Canadian participation. Paget, the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, probably delegated his responsibility for the military side of the raid to Montgomery because Crerar had already insisted that a Canadian division be employed and because this division would necessarily be drawn from what Montgomery liked to call his South-East Army.<sup>9</sup>

Montgomery could, in theory, have delegated his responsibility to a corps or divisional commander - Crerar of the 1st Canadian Corps or J.H. Roberts of the 2nd Canadian Division.



<sup>9</sup> C. Buckley, *Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe* (London, 1951), p. 230; Hamilton, *Montgomery*, I, p. 552; Stacey, *Six Years of War*, I, p. 329; Simonds to Mountbatten, 10 Feb. 1969, quoted in MacIntosh, "Battle of the Blame," *Legion*, Aug. 1985, p. 17; Simonds to Mountbatten, 10 Feb. 1969, quoted in Villa, *Unauthorized Action*, p. 225, note 25.



The complicating factor here was the relationship between Home Forces and a Canadian Army anxious to exert its independence to the full. To have made Crerar or Roberts the responsible military officer would have left Home Forces with almost no effective authority over the raid. For Home Forces, this was unthinkable. Churchill was, at that very time, trying to exclude Home Forces from the preparation of cross-channel operations. Moreover, Home Forces was having enough difficulty dealing with an autonomous national command within its ranks without giving McNaughton's newly established 1st Canadian Army free reign over *Rutter*.<sup>10</sup>

This, along with Montgomery's insistence that the plan must be made by the commander responsible for the battle, might help to explain why he played what was apparently so passive a role in the actual planning of *Rutter*. Preventing the military planning of amphibious operations from becoming the domain of COHQ (or for that matter McNaughton's army) seems to have been one of Montgomery's most active functions. Certainly he wasted no time in removing COHQ planners from *Rutter*. As J.L. Moulton (later chief of British amphibious operations) recalled, only after their initial exclusion were COHQ staff officers surreptitiously sent to work on the plan at the invitation of Churchill Mann, the Brigadier General Staff of the 2nd Canadian Division. Home Forces had no love of private armies; Combined Operations was aspiring to assemble precisely that, and a private navy as well. The idea that a combined operation was a black art, beyond the capability of the regular army, was one that Home Forces intended to stamp out.

Home Forces might also have worried that McNaughton, with his ability to go straight to the prime minister of either Britain or Canada, might become the authority on raids upon



<sup>10</sup> 42(COS) 169(O), 15 June 1942, PRO, Chiefs of Staff Committee memoranda, CAB 80/62; Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, 27 June 1962, IWM, Hughes-Hallett papers.



whom Churchill would rely. (After all, McNaughton was asked to make his own assessment of Churchill's pet project for an invasion of northern Norway after the British Chiefs of Staff had rejected the idea.) The Canadian army was, from the British perspective, looking uncomfortably like a private army, promoting inexperienced officers to high rank in a separate hierarchy, playing one superior authority off against another, fully under the control of neither Home Forces nor Ottawa, something of a law unto itself. Interference in *Rutter* from the Canadian higher command was (as with that from COHQ) firmly resisted by Montgomery. McNaughton and Crerar were, only with difficulty, deflected from interfering in the planning of what they regarded as a Canadian show. According to Walter Skrine, the COHQ planner most closely involved with the military side of *Rutter*, Montgomery himself "lay low throughout." Other than attending a few key meetings in person, Montgomery kept in touch with the planning through Goronwy Rees, an intelligence officer in the South-East Army. Major Rees understood his task to be one of keeping Montgomery "informed of progress of planning and training, of any needs or difficulties that might arise, or any decision that might require his approval." The recollections of Crerar were somewhat different. He told Stacey that "when history is written, it should, I believe, be made clear that the basic tactical planning for the DIEPPE Operation was undertaken by Montgomery (Army), Mountbatten (navy) and Leigh-Mallory (Air). Roberts, then commanding 2 Canadian Division, worked out the detail plans for the employment of forces but the basic plan for the Army was that of Montgomery." Despite Crerar's assertions, Montgomery seems to have been principally concerned to use Home Forces' authority over the operation to keep rival organizations out and allow the 2nd Canadian Division to take charge of military planning free from the interference of either COHQ or the Canadian higher command.<sup>11</sup>



<sup>11</sup> Moulton to Mountbatten, 29 Jan. 1958, ADM 205/173; Skrine to Haydon, 14 Oct. 1958, IWM, Haydon papers; G. Rees, *A Bundle of Sensations* (London, 1960), pp. 140-41; Stacey, *Six Years of War*, I, pp. 408-9; Crerar to Stacey, 11 June 1944, RG 24, vol. 10,634.

Delaying the arrival of the first assault from a time of comparative darkness to one of greater light was Montgomery's decision, made against the advice of Combined Operations planners; or so argued the defenders of COHQ in the late 1950s. The outline plan, as approved by the Chiefs of Staff, called for landings on the flanks to commence 30 minutes after nautical twilight, with the frontal assault following 30 minutes after the flank attack. By the time that the first full-scale exercise for *Rutter* was undertaken, the frontal assault was intended to be delayed for a further 30 minutes. If Montgomery was behind a change in the plan's schedule, it was probably this: the delay that would give the first landings 60 instead of 30 minutes to secure the flanks before the landings commenced on the beach in front of Dieppe. This delay would not, however, have meant that the *Rutter* plan left the troops landing in front of Dieppe with less cover of darkness than they would have in *Jubilee* (as the operation was styled after it was cancelled and then revived in July). Because the *Rutter* landings were scheduled to begin closer to the start of nautical twilight, and would have taken place at a time when twilight extended over a longer period, *Rutter's* plan gave the assaulting forces just as much time to cross the beach before sunrise as *Jubilee's*. After Montgomery's exclusion from the operation, the plan, after careful consideration, reverted to the original schedule.<sup>12</sup>


That the schedule of landings in *Rutter* was different from both the outline plan and from the *Jubilee* plan was never acknowledged in COHQ post-raid narratives. (The staff involved in planning *Jubilee* must have been sensitive to the fact that they, and not Montgomery, advocated a frontal assault commencing before the east and west headlands would be captured.)



<sup>12</sup> "Alternative Draft for Paragraph 3," enclosed with Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, 22 July 1958, ADM 205/173; Outline plan attached to Mountbatten to Baillie-Grohman, 13 May 1942, ADM 179/220; Operation *Yukon* list of order, 9 June 1942, ADM 179/222; "Raid on Dieppe," 15, ADM 205/174.

Hughes-Hallett and Mountbatten succeeded in twisting the naval staff history of the Dieppe raid to read that as soon as Montgomery became involved, he rejected the COHQ plan, proposing "that a dawn frontal assault should be made instead, to be synchronized with two smaller landings on either side." This replaced an earlier draft stating that the frontal assault (agreed by COHQ and Home Forces planners) "was not to be launched until two flank attacks, to be carried out against the batteries east and west of Dieppe, had been successfully delivered." It was only while Montgomery was the responsible military officer that the plan, even in theory, allocated enough time for the flanks to be secured prior to the frontal assault. Thus the changes to the schedule of landings made while he was in the chain of command may have made the *Rutter* plan better (they certainly made it no worse) than either the initial outline or final *Jubilee* plans.<sup>13</sup>

The principal change to the plan which others involved in the raid have tried to lay at Montgomery's doorstep has, of course, been the removal of the preliminary heavy air bombardment. Montgomery did himself no favour by claiming in his memoirs that he would never have agreed to such a change. Unfortunately for him, he (and not Mountbatten) chaired the 5 June meeting at which this decision was taken. Montgomery is not recorded as having voiced any objection. In his defense, Montgomery claimed that he was unwilling to contradict the force commanders: he would not over-rule Roberts once Roberts had accepted Leigh-Mallory's view that the heavy bombing (which had a poor chance of being effective in the dark) should be cut out. In any case, the whole question of air support was reconsidered after Montgomery was excluded from the chain of command; but neither Mountbatten (who had acquired even greater authority over raids by the time of *Jubilee*), nor Hughes-



<sup>13</sup> See correspondence between Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett and various drafts of the Naval Staff History in ADM 205/173 and ADM 205/174.



Hallett (the new naval force commander), nor Crerar (who replaced Montgomery as the “responsible military officer”) insisted on any significant changes to this aspect of the plan.<sup>14</sup>

Although the process by which the raid was remounted and launched as *Jubilee* is not perfectly clear, there is little doubt that Montgomery was, from the start, dead set against giving the planned attack on Dieppe a second life. Immediately upon the cancellation of *Rutter* on 7 July due to unsuitable weather, Crerar was told that, in view of the impossibility of maintaining security, Montgomery had “recommended to the powers that be that the operation be off for all time.” Sometime around 18 July, Montgomery learned that the operation was going to be revived and that he would be excluded from the chain of command. At this stage, Montgomery apparently wrote to Paget, again recommending that the raid be cancelled for all time, arguing that if a raid were desirable, another target should be selected.<sup>15</sup>

Hughes-Hallett, ever anxious to discredit Montgomery, claimed that the “real reason why Monty recommended that the operation should be dropped was that he had been removed from the chain of command and was bitterly offended.” But, as we have seen, Montgomery made his views known to Crerar and “the powers that be” almost two weeks previously. More likely is that Montgomery was never included in the *Jubilee* chain of command because he (like Rear-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman, the *Rutter* naval force commander who was replaced by Hughes-



<sup>14</sup> Montgomery, *Memoirs*, p. 76; “Minutes of Meeting of Council and Advisers to CCO,” 5 June 1942, CMHQ 153; Villa, *Unauthorized Action*, pp. 152-3, note 63; “Close- Up: Dieppe,” DND, 594.009(D13).

<sup>15</sup> Chilton to Crerar, 7 July 1942, RG 24, vol. 10,750; Memorandum on operation *Jubilee* by McNaughton, 20 July 1942, IWM, Hughes-Hallett papers; Memorandum on operation *Jubilee* by McNaughton, 25 July 1942, NAC, McNaughton papers, MG 30, E133, vol. 248, War Diary Appendix “K”; Rees, *Bundle of Sensations*, pp. 159-60; Montgomery, *Memoirs*, p. 76.



Hallett for *Jubilee*) was unlikely to support the revival of the *Rutter* plan.<sup>16</sup>

This begs the question of whether Montgomery, and for that matter Home Forces, would have succeeded merely in being excluded from the raid at an earlier date if Montgomery had called *Rutter* to a halt in the planning stages. That Montgomery might have done so presupposes that he regarded his role as one of second-guessing the military force commander. He seems, however, to have believed quite the opposite. He was there, he said, "to make certain that Roberts got whatever he wanted." Rees confirmed this when he wrote that Montgomery's responsibility "was confined to actually mounting the operation and training the troops." Acceptance of this leads to the conclusion that unless Roberts took a stand against some unsatisfactory aspect of the plan, or the plan as a whole, Montgomery was not going to act to halt the project.<sup>17</sup>

Roberts's own freedom of manoeuvre was, however, so tightly circumscribed that there seems to have been little alternative to either proceeding with the original plan, making do with whatever forces were available, or abandoning it completely. And for both Combined Operations and the Canadian Army in Britain, the latter was hardly an alternative at all.<sup>18</sup> And therein might lie one of the keys to explaining the disaster. For while the Canadian Army and Combined Operations were desperate for a cross channel raid, the Royal Navy and Bomber Command were not. If an operation on this scale were to succeed (if indeed an outright success in this sort of operation could ever be possi-



<sup>16</sup> Hughes-Hallett to Mountbatten, 27 June 1962, IWM, Hughes-Hallett papers; Villa, *Unauthorized Action*, pp. 195-96.

<sup>17</sup> "Close-Up: Dieppe," DND, 594.009(D13); Rees, *Bundle of Sensations*, pp. 159-60.

<sup>18</sup> Wildman-Lushington to Mountbatten, 29 April 1942, and "Extract from Meeting of Council of Advisers," 3 June 1942, PRO Combined Operations papers, DEFE 2/552.

ble), all three services had to put a major force at risk. The Canadian Army's, Combined Operation's, and even Home Forces' mistake was to think that they could succeed without the whole-hearted support of the other services.

Mountbatten, Hughes-Hallett and Crerar, the commanders most determined to press ahead with the raid even when the naval and air forces committed to the operation were so obviously inadequate, are precisely the men who have shown the least reluctance to shift responsibility for *Jubilee's* shortcomings to Montgomery. The only source for the belief that Montgomery introduced a frontal assault into the outline plan was Hughes-Hallett, who was himself (as one of the COHQ-Home Forces team charged with producing an outline plan) formally responsible for it. Canadian troops became involved not because Montgomery chose the 2nd Canadian division, but because Mountbatten's organization was dreaming up schemes for immediate action against the continent and because Crerar was determined that a Canadian formation must take part. Montgomery's responsibility for the absence of heavy bombing in *Rutter* is, at most, no greater than Mountbatten's, Hughes-Hallett's, and Crerar's responsibility for the same in *Jubilee*. The raid's schedule of landings was changed after Montgomery ceased to be involved and would probably not have been approved by him. Finally, Hughes-Hallett's suggestion that Montgomery only advised cancelling the raid for all time out of pique at being excluded from the chain of command ignores the fact that Montgomery made his views clear well before he was displaced by Crerar.

Nigel Hamilton has suggested that the problem with Montgomery's performance with respect to *Rutter* was that he lacked a first-class staff officer to back him up. The foregoing analysis suggests, however, that the absence of such an officer, in Montgomery's own command at least, was irrelevant. Montgomery's overt function was to assist the 2nd Canadian Division to mount the operation and provide Roberts with whatever support, material or moral, he requested. Less obviously, the unstated intention of Home Forces in appointing

Montgomery seems to have been to prevent operations against the continent from becoming the exclusive purview of either Combined Operations or the Canadian Army. Home Forces must also have hoped that Montgomery would ensure that the influence of the Canadian Army and Combined Operations did not lead the project off the rails. Unfortunately for Montgomery, by the time that he became involved it was already (and possibly irretrievably) heading down the wrong track. When Montgomery did think that it was about take a disastrous turn, his advice that another target be chosen was ignored. The worst that can be said of Montgomery was that he was no better at forecasting a disaster in an amphibious operation than the force commanders, Combined Operations Headquarters, or two former Chiefs of the Canadian General Staff (Crerar and McNaughton). But unlike those commanders who were responsible for *Jubilee*, at least he cannot be charged with being so determined to justify either his position or his organization's existence through a raid that he was not prepared to abandon a plan.<sup>19</sup>



<sup>19</sup> Villa, *Unauthorized Action*, pp. 13, 198-99 note 28, and pp. 202-3; Hamilton, *Montgomery*, I, pp. 552-53.